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Several connections between the concepts underlying the theory 
of revealed preference and the concepts underlying solutions to cooperative 
games, have been established by Wilson [ 9 ]. In this paper we provide 
some new connections. Wilson established the relationship between the solu-
tion concept of Von Neumann and Morgenstern and the strongest forms of 
rational choice found at Richter ( 6 ) and Hanuon ( 4 ). Here, for the cases 
of finite sets of alternatives we provide connections with weaker "degrees" 
of rationality found at Plott [ 5 ], Richter [ 6 ], and Sen [ 7 ). 
NOTATION AND FORMULATION 
We let E be a universal set of alternatives and let fl be a 
nonernpty family of subsets of E. The family fl is a clau of admissible 
sets of feasible alternatives. A choice function is a function which has 
fl as a domain and subsets of E as the domain. If C(v) is a choice function 
we assume that.¢ I C(v)C:v for v E fl. The set C(v) is termed the ~ 
!.£!.and vis termed the feasible set. 
We are interested in structures for which C(v) is a model of a 
process. The set vis the feasible set and C(v) are the "outcomes." If 
C(v) Is not a single element of E, then the interpretation is that the process 
2 
bas multiple "equilibriums" for that feasible set. Since C(•) is a model 
of a process there must be, of course, other parameters (such as individual 
preferences). For purposes of this paper we assume they are constant 
and therefore not listed. 
We will need the following definitions. For a given structure 
(fl, C(·l) we define a particular binary relation, V, on E. We say 
xVy ~ (x y)or{(~v)vEfl:x E C(v)&:yE v). 
A choice function is rational in case there exists a binary relation, R, 
onE such that (Vv) g C(v) = [x E v: xRy for ally E v). 
ve,.. 
Let Q be an arbitrary binary relation on E. We shall sometimes study 
choice structures, (13, C(· i> , which have some of the following properties. 
Congruence Property, CP(Q) : (Vx)xEv(Vv)vEil[x E C(v) ~ (~y)yEC(v): xQy] 
Solution Property, SP(Q) : (Vx)xEv(Vv)vEfl[x E C(v)-===> (Vy)yEC(v)xQy) 
Core Property, KP(Q) : (Vx) (Vv) [x E C(v) -.> (Vy) xQy). 
xEv vEil yEv 
The first axiom has been motivated by the theory of revealed 
preference. The second and third axioms come from game theory. In 
order to see the first simply let Q be the binary relation V as defined 
above. The axiom, in this special case, becomes equivalent toR ichters 
W - axiom which under certain conditions is equivalent to the weak axiom 
of revealed preference. 
The second two axioms in this axiomatic form have not received much 
attention in the literature. Von Neumann and Morgenstern did axiomatize the 
solution concept [ 8 , pp. ) but since then, to my knowledge, Wilson [ 9 J has 
provided the only application of the axiom. In order to understand these axioms, 
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imagine that we are modeling a game. The universal set of al,ternatives 
ia a aet E, but the feasible set v may not be the universal set. The 
rules and structure of the game combine with individual preferences to 
form a dominance relation, D, over the elements of E. That ia, for any 
pair if xDy we know the members of some coalition prefer x to y and 
have the "power to enforce" x over y. Now if we let xQy mean y "does ~ 
dominate" x (i. e • .,-yDx) we cdn see that if (and only-if) the choice 
function satisfies SP(Q) the elements of C(v) form a Von Neumann-
Morgenstern solution. That is, every feasible, not chosen element 
ie dominated by some chosen element and if two elements are chosen 
together, then neither dominates the other. Similarly, if the choice 
function satisfies KP(Q), where Q means "does not dominate," then C(v), 
for any v, is the core of the underlying game. 
RESULTS: REVEALED PREFERENCE 
We wish first to focus on the relationship between the three 
properties discussed and the propositions which underlie revealed 
preference theory (namely the V relation and the concept of rational 
choice). We show that when things are taken in the proper combination 
each of the properties is equivalent to a different "degree" of rational 
choice. 
Theorem 1. Let E be finite and let f3 be power set (set of all subsets) 
of E. The function C( •) satisfies CP(V) if and only if there exists a 
binary relation R on E such that 
l) (Vv) gC(v) 
vE.., {x E v: xRy for ally E v) 
ll) R is total and reflexive 
and 
ill) R is transitive. 
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Proof. This theorem is a special case of theorems developed at ( 6) and 
Theorem 2. Let E be finite and let f3 be the power set (set of all subsets) 
· of E and let R be any total, reflexive transitive binary relation on E. 
Let C(v) = {x E v : xRy for ally E v}. Then, in this case C(v) I~ for v e f3 
and the choice structure (f3, C(· )) satisfies CP(V). 
Proof. Again this is a special case of known results [ 6 ]. 
Definition: a binary relation R is said to be quasi-transitive in case 
[xRy & -. yRx) and [yRz & .., zRy) implies [xRz & -, zRx), i.e., 
xPy & yPz ==> xPz. 
Theorem 3. Let E be finite and let f3 be the power set (set of all subsets) 
of E. If the function C(•) satisfies SP(V) then there exists a binary relation 
R on E such that 
1) (Vv)vEf3C(v) = {x f' v: xRy for ally E v} 
ii) R is total and reflexive 
and 
ill) R is quasi-transitive. 
Proof. Suppose (fl, C(' l) satisfies SP(V) then {x E v : xVy for y E v} c C(v). 
In order to see this assume xVy for all y E v and note that this implies 
xVy for y E C(v) which, by SP(V), implies x E C(v). Now, suppose x E C(v), 
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then, by deflnltlon xVy for all y E v eo {x E v : xVy for y E v] ;j C(v). 
From the two conclullone taken together we eee that SP(V) impliee 
(Vv) 
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C(v) = {x E v : xVy for y E v] which, by letting V = R becomee (i). ve . 
Slnce ( x, y] E f!, for all x, y, we obtain (ii). With R as defined suppose 
xPy and yPz. We know then, that y ~ C((x,y,z)) since this would mean 
yVx which, together with SP(V) meane y E C({x, y)l and yRx contrary 
to hypothesis. We know by a similar argument that z i C((x, y, z) ). 
Coneequently, x = C([x, y, z}) and..., zVx, slnce, otherwise, by SP(V), 
we would have z E C( (x, y, z} ). But.., zVx, by definition of R, means xPz, 
eo R ie quasi-transitive as demanded by (iii). • 
Theorem 4. Let E be !inite and let R be any total, reflexive, quasi-
transitive binary relation on E. Let f1 be the power set of E and dellne 
tor v E fj, C(v) = (x E v: xRy for ally E v). In this case Q, C(• 1) satiefles 
SP(V). 
Proof of 4. We know !rom [ 7 , theorem J that C(v) I 1/J tor all 
v E fl. We note now that xRy if and only if xVy. 
Suppose xVy. Then there il a v such that x E C(v) andy E v. But 
then by construction of C(• ), it tallows that xRy. Suppose xRy. From 
the construction of C(·) it follows that x E C((x, y)) so we have xVy. 
Chaining these two observations together with the definition of C(·) we get 
(I) (Vx) , (Vv) Eg (x E C(v) ~ (Vy) E xVy} which impliee 
Xt;V V I"' y V 
Now euppose x 0 Vy for all y E C(v) and that x 0 I. C(v). Since 
x 0 I. C(v) and since C( •) Is by (l )"all of the V maximal elements, there 
existe an x 1 such that..., x_0 Vx 1• Clearly x 1 ~ C(v) for otherwise would 
yield x 0 Vxi contrary to construction. Since x 1 i C(v) there exists, by (I), 
an xz such that..., xi Vxz. If xz E C(v) we would have x 0 Vxz from our 
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Initial hypothesie but this would violate the conclusion., x0 Vxz which 
follows from the quaei-transitivlty of R (and thus V). If xz ~ C(v), as 
concluded, there exists, by virtue of ( 1), an x
3 
such that..., xz Vx
3
• By 
repeating the argument we obtain a sequence, x 0 , x 1, xz• • • • , such 
that for each i there exists an i + 1 such that -,x1Vxi+l is the case 
and such that each element is distinct (If xi = xk then we would have, 
contrary to hypothesis, C([x.,xi I' xi z• •••• X ,X. }I = 1/J). 
1 + + k-1 k 
This conclusion violates the assumption of finite E. We conclude then that 
x 0 E C(v) or, in general that 
We only need note that { Z ) and ( 3) together {arm a statement of SP(V) • 
Theorem 5. Let E be flnite and let j:l be power set (set of all subsets) 
of E. If Q• C(· i) satislles KP(V) then there exists a binary relation 
R onE such that 
i) 
U) 
(Vv) gC(v) = {x·E v: xRy tor ally E v} ve .... 
R is total and reflexive. 
Proof. Suppose (f!, C(• I) aatisfie!ll KP(V). Then, by definition, v 
eatlsfies (i) and since 13 contains all two element sete V satisfies (li). 
Simply let R = V and we are llnished 1 
Theorem 6. Let E be finite and let j:l be the power set of E and let R be 
any binary relation such that C(v) I ¢ for v E 13 and C(v) = (x E v : xRy 
for all y E v). In this case (13, C(• I) satisfies KP(V). 
Proof. We note xRy ~ xVy and the statement of the definition of 
C(·) becomes KP(V) • 
. ·- ---·----~~ ·-·-···-~---·~---- . ·---·- ... --·~-- ·-- ·--- -~-----·---·· ---- ... ---------,.··~--------·---------···-···-···----~----·-· 
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RESULTS: REVEALED DOMINANCE 
The above results establish the relationship between the axioms 
and a particular binary relation. This_ binary relation, V, is determined by 
the internal structure of the particular choice function under consideration. 
It remains to establish relationships between a choice function and the 
structure of some, arbitrar~·. underlying dominance r·elation. 
Consider the following motivation. We have observed (or are 
observing) the cperations of a process. We know little or nothing about 
the underlying institutions but we would like to begin an investigation 
of them. Only the choices C(v, ~) where~ is a vector of parameters 
* and v is the feasible set, are known. Could this choice function have 
been generated by an underlying cooperative game? Il so, what is the 
structure of the game? 
These questions cannot be completely answered now, even though 
some headway has been made (Bloomfield ( 1 ), Bloomfield and Wilson 
( Z )]. For now we supply an answer to a subproblem. !! the parameters 
if are fixed and!! C(•) is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution to some 
underlying dominance relation D, what is that dominance relation? 
Does the process act !.!. !f such an underlying dominance relation exists? 
We answer this question for the special case where E is finite and we 
have observed the value of C(v) for all possible states of v and .!!!2.!!. 
importantly where C(•) is rational, 
Definition: Let D be a "dominance relation"; xDy means x "dominates" 
y in the sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. We define xUy ¢==>..., yDx; 
xUy means x is undominated by y. 
* The difficult operational problems posed by the possibility that 
C(·, ·) contains more than O!.e element, will not be addressed. 
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Theorem 7: U C(v) I ~ for all v c E, E is finite and there exists a 
total, reflexive binary relation, R, such that (Vv) EC(v) = {x E v: xRy 
vc 
for ally E v} then there exists an asymmetric binary relation D, over E, 
such that (Vv) E({x,y E C(v)=> [•xDy& •yDx)] and {y E v'\.C(v)=:> 
vc 
(:!x)x E C(v) : xDy) J if and only if R is quasi-transitive. 
Proof. Suppose R is quasi-transitive. Then let V =- U and by previous 
theorem 4, we know Q. C(· l) satisfies SP(U). That is, we know 
(Vv) E(Vx) [x E C(v) ._.. (Vy) C( )-, yDx) 
vc xev yE v 
which can be seen to be the desired property, 
Now suppose C(·) is rational and that D ill an asymmetric binary 
relation such that ~, C(• ~ satisfies SP(U). We need to show only 
that R is quasi-transitive. Assume x = C({x, y)) andy= C({y, z} ), 
Since SP(U) is satisfied we know (xDy & I yDx] and [yDz & I zDy]. 
We also know xPy and yPz which allows us to conclude, from the 
properties of R, that x = C((x, y, z} ). This observation yields [xDz & 1 zDx) 
to be the case, using SP(U) and the asimmetry of D. Using SP(U) again we 
see x = C((x, z}) which implies xPz and allows us to conclude that R is quasi-
transitive • 
The fact that ~· C(· l) was ration'll played no small role in 
the proof of the last theorem. This property of a choice function may be 
present but it does not follow from the nature of Von-Neumann-Morg•mstern 
solutions alone. The following remark makes the point clearly. 
Remark: There exists an asymmetric dominance relation, D, and a 
choice function C(·) such that 
I) C (v) I ~ for all subsets. 
ii) <Jl. C(· ~ satisfies SP(U). 
Ul) There does~ exist a binary relation, R, such that 
(Vv) "C(v) = (xEv:xRyforyEv}. ve ... 
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Proof. We need only consider an example. Let E = (x, y, z), I xDy, 
"""1yDx, yDz, •zDy, zDx, """1xDz; C((x,y)l = {x,y}. C({y,z)l "y, 
C({x,z)) = z, C({x,y,z)l = {x,y). The reader can verify that q,C(·~ 
satisfies SP(U). To show C(·) satisfies (iii) simply note that C({x, z} = z 
implies -, xR z for any candidate, R, but this contradicts the fact that xRz 
for any candidate R, which is implied by the fact that x E C( (x, y, z}) • 
We can ask a question similar to the above only rather than demand 
that C(·) reflect a Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution(s) of an underlying 
dominance relation we can demand that it reflect the core. 
~~· Let E be a finite set and let ~ be the power set of E. Let C(•) 
be a choice function such that 
i) C(v) ~ - for v E ~· 
li) (Vv) C(v) = {x E v: xRy for y E v} for some total, reflexive R, vE~ 
then there exists an asymmetric binary relation D such that 
Iii) (Vv)vE~C(v) = {x E v: ""1yDx for ally E v}. Furthermore, 
let D be any asymmetric binary relation such that the choice function 
induced by (iii) satisfies (i). Then there exists an R satisfying (ii). 
Proof. Let D be any asymmetric binary relation and let C(·) satisfy (i) 
and (iii). Now define xRy~ [-,yDx or x = y] and we get the statement 
(ii). Now take an arbitrary R which induces, by (ii) a choice function 
satisfying (i). Define xUy.:::::::;. xRy and note that (iii becomes (iii). The 
requisite relation Dis simply xDy ~ •yUx 1 
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In pasaing we should note that the hypothesis (i) used in this 
theorem is not without considerable strength. In effect, it demands 
that the core, from any subset is nonempty. This requirement is clearly 
not met by all dominance relations. The the.orem then, specifies that 
exactly those dominance relations whose negations form suborders [3 ] . 
have the· property. 
We can state one final theorem which deals with the case where 
the choice (or outcome) ovet any set is but a single element. This is 
a case where, from one point of view, all of these ideas become the 
same idea. We state, without proof, the following theorem and corollary. 
Theorem 9. Let E be finite and let ~ be the power set of E. Suppose 
for all v E ~. C(v) contains one and only one element. If ~· Cl·1> 
satisfies any one of KP(V), SP(V), CP(V) or the weak axiom of revealed 
preference then it satisfies them all. 
Corollary. Let E be finite and let ~ be the power set of E. Suppose 
for all v E ~. C(v) contains one and only one element. Let Q be any 
total, antisymmetric binary relation on E. II C(·) satisfies any of 
KP(Q ), CP(Q) or SP(Q) then it satisfies them all, and, in addition, 




From a very broad point of view we are pursuing the pouibility 
of making inferences from the behavior of a process about the underlying 
institutions which define the process. Suppose we are observing the 
outcomes of a process and we are willing to assume that the process 
can properly be describe~ as a cooperative game. Can we infer, from 
the process behavior, what the underlying dominance relation must be? 
Can we identify a "revealed" dominance relation? From the dominance 
relation we might then be able to infer something about the institutions 
we would expect to find upon closer examination. 
Answers to this question, for the finite case, are partially 
provided by theorems 7, 8 and 9. Theorem 7 shows that a rational 
choice function can be viewed as a unique solution of a game if and only 
l.f it is quasi-transitive rational. Theorem 8 shows a choice function 
can be a core of a game if and only if it is rational. Theorem 9 and its 
corollary show that a choice function which chooses but a single element 
reflects some underlying game if and only if it is consistent with a 
strong ordering in the revealed preference sense. 
The remaining theorems ( 1 thru 6) serve to connect game 
solution axioms with other axioms which have been evolving in the 
revealed preferen<:e literature. They show that KP(V), SP(V) and 
CP(V) are, under certain conditions, equivalent to rational choice, 
qua.si-transitive rational choice and transitive rational choice, respectively. 
Under the same conditions each of these "degrees" of rational choice has 
been characterized in terms of both path independence type axioms and 
revealed preference axioms [ 4 ], [5), [6 ], [7]. These theorems, then, 
serve to establish equivalence between concepts of "solutions," concepts 
of "revealed preference," and concepts of "rational choice." 
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